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SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SECURITIES BUSINESS*
HowARD C. WESTWOODt AND EDWARD G. HowARD$
The increasing burden of government is of universal concern. As the state and
its processes become more unwieldy there are some, at least, who look with hope to
the assumption by non-state agencies of a portion of the task of social control.
The modern development of arbitration reflects dissatisfaction with the state's
means for settling disputes between people. Far less developed are means for
regulating, through non-state agencies, relations between people and their community.
Whatever hope may have sprung from Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States'
that the antitrust laws would tolerate a measure of business self-government, later
cases have sharply restricted the possibilities.2 But demand for such self-government
continues and society has a way of responding to demand.
In a manner thus far unique in our economic life, the securities business has
evolved social controls through private agencies which are drastic and extensive. This
article undertakes briefly to examine certain phases of the relationship between the
state and the private agencies exercising control over the members of that business.
Generally speaking, trading in securities occurs through two media. One is the
organized exchange. The other is the over-the-counter market. The exchange is a
specific market place, with a limited number of stalls. The over-the-counter market
is quite unlimited; any number of traders (i.e., broker-dealers) may participate in
it anywhere at any time.3
In the case of the organized exchanges our inquiry must be directed principally to
the decisions of courts applying common-law rules. In the case of the over-the-
counter market our inquiry must be directed to decisions of an administrative
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, applying a statutory system.
THE EXCHANGES
No court has yet held that the antitrust laws affect the freedom of stock exchanges
to decline to admit new members,4 or to regulate the admission of members; and
* SEC Releases cited in this article are those issued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such
Releases are generally reported in CCH, Federal Securities Law Reports, but not always in full.
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1 288 U. S. 344 0933).
'Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457 (1941).
a Neither state nor federal law restricts the number of such traders for economic reasons, even where
there is a licensing procedure. The amount of over-the-counter trading exceeds trading on the organized
exchanges. REGULAToN OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET, SEN. REP. No. 1455, 75 th Cong., 3 d Scss.
2 (1938), H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938).
"But cf. United States v. Tarpon Springs Sponge Exchange, 142 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir. x944),
upholding the sufficiency of a Sherman Act indictment alleging, among other elements of a conspiracy,
the restriction of membership as an "exchange" dealing in sponges "saw fit."
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this freedom is accompanied by a freedom to adopt rules as to the conduct of the
members which are enforced by the power to expel. An exchange may, for example,
require its members not to deal with non-members, and may fine or expel them if
they do, without violating the Sherman Act More than that, it has been decided
that the antitrust laws permit an exchange to require that its members, even in
trading outside the precincts of the exchange, adhere to certain exchange rules as
a condition of retention of membership The fact is that stock exchanges seem to
have been permitted to function almost as though there were no antitrust problem
at all. Except for other statutory regulation, to which we shall later refer, the
technical relationship of the exchange to the state is, roughly, the same as the relation-
ship of a private club.7
It is obvious that under this construction of the antitrust laws the state's regula-
tion of the relations between the exchanges and their members is very restricted, or
was so before the passage of the securities legislation of 1933-1934. In consequence, the
practices of the securities exchanges constitute an outstanding example of the extent
to which largely private regulation of an important part of economic life can take the
place of governmental control.
The rules which a stock exchange can adopt as a means of controlling the se-
curities business fall into three categories: (i) those regulating the dealings of
members among themselves; (2) those regulating the conduct of members in dealing
with the public; and (3) those regulating the conduct of corporations whose
securities are listed by the exchange and traded in by exchange members. All three
kinds of rules may have a distinct effect on society as a whole s Since all three are
ultimately enforced by the sanction of expulsion (or removal from listing of the
stock of a particular corporation), the effectiveness of the sanction measures the
effectiveness of the rules themselves.
In upholding suspensions or expulsions of stock exchange members for in-
fractions of exchange rules, the courts have ordinarily relied on contract doctrines
to support procedures which they would be quick to condemn if contained in a
statute, and substantive rules which, if rules of statutory law, might well have been
invalidated as arbitrary and capricious.?
In the realm of procedure, for example, an accused exchange member is not
'Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604 (z898) (alternative holding).
B oard of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918).
See Belton v. Hatch, xog N. Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225, 226 (x888) (making the club analogy in speaking
of the New York Stock Exchange).8 For example, a "housekeeping" rule giving the exchange a lien on the proceeds of a member's seat
for litigation expenses in connection therewith may operate to defeat the outside creditor of a member
even though his claim was reduced to judgment before the exchange rule was adopted. Jackson v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 259 App. Div. 329, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 207 (ist Dep't 1940). But cf. Cohen v.
Budd, 52 Misc. 217, 103 N. Y. Supp. 45 (Sup. Ct. 19o6) (exchange rule cannot defeat right of trustee in
bankruptcy to assets owed bankrupt member by other members).
'For the courts' reliance on the contract between the member and the exchange as the basis for
expulsion' according to the terms of the contract, cf. Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N. Y. 407, 103 N. E. 708
(1913).
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entitled to be represented by counsel in expulsion proceedings if the constitution or
bylaws forbid.' Even notice that expulsion proceedings are about to be brought or
that a member has been suspended, though essential when the constitution and
bylaws are silent,11 need not be given when the "contract" between member and
exchange excludes it.'0
An exchange need not give notice to a member that it is conducting an investiga-
tion which may lead to the filing of charges against him unless its constitution and
bylaws so require. 3 The question of what the constitution and bylaws do or do not
require-their "interpretation"-can be conclusively determined by the exchange's
board of governors if their power to do so is granted thereby. 4
When an expulsion proceeding takes place, it is proper for exchange members or
officials who preferred charges to sit on the tribunal which must determine the
truth of such charges and the penalty for violation.'
In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Nelson, the Illinois Supreme Court
held itself powerless even to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to support
an expulsion from the Board on the ground that the complainant had been con-
victed by "a tribunal of his own choice."'" More recent cases take a less rigid posi-
tion: in the Avery case the court looked to see whether there had been "some sub-
stantial evidence" of a violation of the exchange's constitution and bylaws before
the exchange tribunal.'
This review of some of the cases shows that the courts have given great latitude to
10 Greene v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, X74 I11. 585, 5i N. E. 599 (1898); see Moyse v.
New York Cotton Exchange, 70 Misc. 609, 613 129 N. Y. Supp. 173, 175-176 (Sup. Ct. 1911), afl'd, 143
App. Div. 265, 128 N. Y. Supp. i12 (ist Dep't 1911) (approving the Greene case, but suggesting that
respondent might demand counsel if bylaws are silent).
"
1 See People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401, 409, 44 N. E. 84, 85
(1896) (obiter statement that notice of expulsion proceedings is "a fundamental principle of justice");
Williamson v. Randolph, 48 Misc. 96, 98, 96 N. Y. Supp. 644, 646 (Sup. Ct. 19o5).
"People ex rel. Dodson v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 224 Ill. 370, 79 N. E. 6z1 (s9o6) (upholding
exchange's suspension of member without notice for non-payment of dues and forfeiture of his membership
on ground that bylaw excluded notice and relator was familiar therewith).
"3 Greene v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 174 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 599 (z898).
"Avery v. Moffatt, z87 Misc. 576, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Mere "practice" or
"custom" of an exchange, however, cannot defeat an explicit provision of its constitution. In the face
of such a provision the accused member, for example, cannot be deprived of his right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses at the expulsion trial by a long-established custom of confining the evidence to
a reading of testimony taken at the preliminary investigation. Jones v Moffatt, 183 Misc. 129, 50
N. Y. S. 2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1944), afl'd without opinion, 268 App. Div. 967 51 N. Y. S. 2d 767 (1st Dep't
1944).
"
5 Avery v. Moffatt, supra note 14. See Greene v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 175 III.
585, 51 N. E. 599 (1898). The court in the Avery case said that this procedure "goes against the grain"
and "has given the court deep concern" (187 Misc. at 584, 55 N. Y. S. 2d at 222) but finally concluded
that it was proper, relying in part on the brief filed by the SEC showing that the same procedure was
prescribed by the rules of most stock exchanges.
16 162 IIL 431, 440, 44 N. E. 743, 746 (1896). The Nelson case was questioned on this point in
In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 13 F. Supp. 6ox, 6o5 (N. D. Il. 1935).
"'Avery v. Moffatr, 187 Misc. 576, 583, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 215, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1945); ci. People ex rel.
Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401, 414, 44 N.E. 84, 87 (1896) (only question of
sufficiency of evidence on appeal is whether the record before the exchange tribunal is so "bare of evi-
dence" that no "honest mind" could find as the tribunal did).
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exchanges in enforcing their own discipline. Though a few cases have required
exchanges to reinstate members expelled without adherence to. their own rules of
procedure' 8 or for violation of a bylaw interpreted unreasonably,' 9 the courts have
unanimously taken the attitude that exchange members, as parties to a voluntary
contract with the exchange, must abide by their agreement. If the exchange has
followed its own procedural rules in expelling a member for violation of a bylaw in
a proceeding not wholly devoid of "natural justice," the proceeding is not review-
able.20 It is irrelevant that the exchange's determination was wrong or that the
court would have imposed a lesser penalty? 1  The Avery case, for example, in-
volved suspension of two exchange members (for 6 and i8 months respectively) for
wrongful acts of their firm and the firm's dominant partner of which they were
without knowledge. 2  The court acknowledged that this discipline was "severe,"
but upheld it because it was not so "arbitrary" or "tyrannical" as to permit judicial
interference-particularly since suspension of personally innocent members for their
firms' defaults was permitted by the constitution of the exchange, to which they had
subscribed?'
The courts have taken much the same attitude toward substantive rules of the
exchanges. If the rule seems even remotely reasonable, it will be upheld over the
protests of a member expelled for its violation, because he contracted to abide by it.
Some courts even hold exchange members estopped to question the reasonableness of
exchange rules in existence at the time of their admission. 4
Take as a single example the question of breach of contract by an exchange
member. Many exchanges have specific rules providing discipline for their mem-
bers' breaches of contract; almost all permit expulsion for conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade. The Supreme Court of Illinois, always
liberal with exchanges, long ago held that an exchange might expel a member for
simple non-fraudulent breach of contract if its bylaws so provided.25 To the con-
tention that such a bylaw was unjust and unreasonable the court had the short
"SE.g., Albers v. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis, X38 Mo. 140, 39 S. W. 473 (X897) (unauthorized
suspension of member who in good faith contested validity of fine).
" E.g., People ex rel. Elliott v. New York Cotton Exchange, 8 Hun :16 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1876)
(member's resort to courts to determine ownership of seat held not "improper conduct" for which he
could be expelled, in absence of explicit provision for exchange's determination of right to seat); cf.
Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N. Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (bylaw which changed purposes of
incorporated club).
0 Cohen v. Thomas, 2o9 N. Y. 407, 103 N. E. 7o8 (913).
" People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401, 44 N. E. 84 (1896);
Young v. Eames, 78 App. Div. 229, 240, 79 N. Y. Supp. xo68, 1075 (Ist Dep't 1903), afi'd without
opinion, 181 N. Y. 542, 73 N. E. 1134 (i9o5); Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Nelson, 162
Ill. 431, 44 N. E. 743 (1896).
" Quaere the disparate suspensions.
2' Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 583, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 215, 220-221 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
"' Bostedo v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 130 II1. App. 560 (i9o6), af'd, 227 Ill. 90, 81
N. E. 42 (1907) (suggesting also that courts are powerless to inquire into reasonableness of exchange
rules).
="People ex rel. Page v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 112 (1867); see People
ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401, 4Xo, 44 N.E. 84, 86 (1896).
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and sound answer that the exchange had been formed to promote high standards
of commercial honor and credit and that this was a good way of doing just that.
The Chicago Board of Trade, the court said, "would soon cease to be respected or
respectable if it tolerated among its members a violation of an undisputed con-
tract."26 Even when no bylaw permits expulsion of an exchange member for "mere"
breach of contract, he can be expelled for breach of contract which is something less
than fraudulent under a bylaw prohibiting conduct "inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade" whether the contract in question was made on or off
the exchange, with a fellow-member or an outsider.27  The Illinois court has per-
mitted expulsion for mere breach of contract under a bylaw proscribing "dishonor-
able or dishonest conduct. 28
Such are the common-law principles which govern securities and other ex-
changes in enforcing their rules against their own members. The exchanges'
powers are plenary; their procedures are summary; their judgment cannot be ques-
tioned on appeal.
Stock exchanges have powers at least as effective over the corporations whose
securities they list, growing out of the fact that listing is a privilege accorded
the corporations by the exchanges. There is a priori no reason why this privilege
cannot be withheld or withdrawn on any terms the exchanges care to ask. There
would appear to be no reason, for example, why a well-established exchange could
not condition the listing of securities on disclosure of the financial condition of
listed corporations just as full as the disclosure now required under federal law.
Perhaps the failure of the exchanges in this and similar respects was one of the causes
of the federal security legislation.
The courts appear to have given little consideration to the effect of exchange
rules respecting the conduct of listed corporations.2 Such rules are usually em-
bodied in agreements required of corporations as a prerequisite to listing.
One such rule, which reduces corporate directors' opportunities to profit from
"inside" knowledge and thereby to bilk the investing public, was adopted under
pressure from Congress itself. This is the rule that a listed corporation must give
prompt publicity to its dividend actions. The instance would be notable if only
because it affords the spectacle of the national legislature threatening remedial
action if the existing state of affairs cannot be corrected by enlarging the rules of a
voluntary association. Moreover, the rule as finally adopted provides the public an
"
5 People ex tel. Page v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 112, x16 (1867).
"People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401, 44 N.E. 84 (1896) (con-
tract with exchange member); In re Haebler v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 44, 44 N.E. 87
(1897) (contract with outsider made outside exchange). In each case the expelled member broke his
contract because of price changes occurring between the making of the contract and the delivery date.
" Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Nelson, 162 Ill. 431, 44 N. E. 743 (1896).
"'In at least one case, however, a stockholder has sued a listed corporation as third-party beneficiary
of a contract between the corporation and the exchange made in conformity to the exchange's listing
requirements. Recovery was denied on the contract ground that plaintiff was a mere incidental bene-
ficiary. Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 19o Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318 (1948).
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effective guarantee unknown to the law and even now embodied in few if any
corporation statutes.
The year x912 saw a crystallization of both public and congressional opinion con-
cerning the "money trust." It was the culmination of a decade or more of "muck-
raking" and "trust-busting." The "money trust" was conceived of as centered in
"Wall Street," composed of banks, insurance companies, investment bankers, and
the New York Stock Exchange, which was thought to furnish all of them facilities
for the "manipulation" of the country's finances. Accordingly, no less than eight
resolutions to investigate the "money trust" were introduced in the House alone at
a single session in i912.3° The stock exchanges, particularly the New York Stock
Exchange, were thought to be at the heart of the money trust. During 1913 and
the early part of 1914, nine bills to regulate stock exchanges were introduced in both
houses of Congress. 1  Almost all these proposed bills sought to deny to stock
exchanges the use of the mails and telephone and telegraph facilities unless certain
reforms were made and specified public information required from listed corpora-
tions.
The report of the so-called Pujo Committee, appointed by the House to investigate
the money trust, laid especial stress on the potential function of the New York
Stock Exchange's listing requirements in reforming corporate practices and pre-
venting corporate "insiders" from profiting from their knowledge. The Committee
was at the same time optimistic about the potential benefit to be secured from
proper listing requirements imposed by law, and concerned because, in its view, the
Exchange had so completely neglected opportunities to do good. It reported :32
Great and much-needed reforms in the organization and methods of our corporations
may be legitimately worked out through the power wielded by the stock exchange over
the listing of securities ...
... complete publicity as to all affairs of a corporation may be uniformly enforced.
The scandalous practices of officers and directors in speculating upon inside and advance
information as to the action of their corporations may be curtailed, if not stopped. In
short its opportunities as an agency of corporate reform are almost endless, provided its
own practices can be reformed so as to entitle it to exercise these broad powers ...
At the time these words were written, the listing requirements of the Exchange
contained no provision for the publication of dividend actions by listed corporations.
This may be seen from the copy of the Exchange's listing requirements submitted
to the Pujo Committee and published as Exhibit 30V in the hearings before the
Committee.33 Thus without violating any rule of the Exchange a director could
10 See 48 CoNG. REc. Index 353 (1912).
" See 50 CONG. REc. 91, 227, 239, 279-280, 5282 (1913); 51 CONG. IEc. 504, 1498, 3874, 8688,
1075, 1iir6-iixi7, 1II66-iII72 (1914).
" INVESTIGATION OF FINA,4IAL AND MONETARY CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER HOUSE
RESOLUTIONS NOS. 429 AND 504 BEFORE A SUBCOMmIITTE OF THE COMmIrrEE ON BANKING AND CUR-
RENcY [hereinafter MoNEY TRUST INvESTIGATION], H. R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 114, I5
(913).
"MONEY TRUST INVESTIGATION, op. cit. supra, at 413-425.
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speculate in his own stock on the certain knowledge that a dividend had or had not
been declared, before that knowledge had been given to the public. And the alleged
prevalence of this practice was among the reasons that induced the Committee to
recommend federal legislative control of stock exchangesY4
Toward the end of 1913, only a few months after the publication of the Money
Trust Investigation proceedings, the Stock Exchange was acutely embarrassed by an
instance of the very situation which certain members of the Pujo Committee and
its counsel had declaimed against. Early in the year, the Goodrich Rubber Co.
had declared a dividend payable toward the end of the year. The corporation's
action was not disclosed to the public. The directors stated that dividend action
had been taken early in the year because the securing of a quorum of the board
later in the year was problematical; and the action had not been publicized because
interim changes in business conditions might have made it necessary for the divi-
dend to be rescinded 5
On the whole, though the Exchange fully exonerated the directors of Goodrich
from any wrongdoing, the transaction emphasized the opportunities which corpo-
rate insiders had in such a situation for obtaining substantial profits. Indeed, during
the period between declaration of the dividend and the public announcement, Good-
rich preferred, the stock in question, had slumped I6 points owing to public fear
that the dividend would be passed 8
In view of the activities of Congress and the unfortunate timing of the Goodrich
dividend announcement, it is hardly surprising that within a few weeks thereafter
the Exchange announced a new listing requirement which obligated listed corpora-
tions to agree with the Exchange at the time of listing "to publish promptly to bond
and stock holders any action in respect to dividends on shares [or] interest on
bonds .... ,37
The many changes in the securities business brought about by the Securities
Exchange Act of 193438 are well known. It is not so well known that the Act made
"See Brief of Pujo Committee counsel (Samuel Untermeyer) before Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, in support of S. 3895, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (Mar. x6 1914); Hearings before Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3895, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 506 (1914); testimony of Harry
Content, a Stock Exchange member, MONFY TRusr INVEsGAooN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 870; testi-
mony of George W. Perkins, a former Morgan partner, id. at 1617.
"It seems a matter of doubt, however, whether a dividend once declared can be rescinded without
the stockholders' consent. See ix FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §5323 (1932).
"See the report of the case contained in the New York Times, Dec. 4, 1913, P. 2, col. 4. The
sub-headline reads: "Insiders Knew It Was Safe." See also editorial, N. Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1913, p. 10,
col. 3: 'Even from a purely selfish point of view, the Stock Exchange has much more to gain by taking
an advanced stand than it has by holding back until enlightened public opinion on such questions as are
here involved [the Goodrich case] secures the sanction of law."
"'The public announcement of the new listing agreement was made on Jan. 16, 1914. See N. Y.
Times, Jan. i6, 1914, p. 12, col. 6. The text of the agreement itself is published as Exhibit "D" in
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3895, 63 d Cong., 2d Sess. 743
(1914). In testimony before the Senate Committee subsequent to the adoption of the agreement, Henry
K. Pomroy, a member of the Board of Governors of the Exchange, explained to Senator Nelson that
the new agreement was directly inspired by the Goodrich case. Id. at 201. The rule as it existed in
1932 is quoted in Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., x9o Md. 52, 54, 57 A.2d 318, 319-320 (948).
s 48 STAT. 88i, 15 U. S. C. §78 et seq. (1934).
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very little change in the rights of the stock exchanges to discipline their members
and to prescribe conditions of listing for corporate securities. The main effect of the
Act with respect to the discipline of exchange members was to add to the exchanges'
existing rights the additional right of the Commission under Section ig(a) (3) to
suspend or expel members or officers of exchanges who violate either the Act or
rules of the Commission.
Section 6(b) of the Act provides that no exchange can be registered with the
SEC unless it adopts rules which include "provision for the expulsion, suspension,
or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade." The SEC appears at one time to have doubted
whether it had power to revoke or suspend the registration of an exchange if, after
having adopted such rules, the exchange failed to enforce them. In connection with
the handling of the notorious Whitney case by the New York Stock Exchange and
the handling of the almost equally notorious Cuppia case by the New York Curb
Exchange, the SEC in 1941 proposed legislation authorizing it to suspend or revoke
an exchange's registration "for failure to enforce compliance with the exchange's
rules.""9  The requested legislation was not adopted. But in Baird v. Franklin4
the court held that Section 6(b) of the Act imposed a duty on exchanges to enforce
the rules required by that Section. This was a civil suit for damages brought against
the New York Stock Exchange by a customer of Richard Whitney's who had suffered
from the Whitney defalcations. Although the opinion in the Baird case did not
discuss the duty to enforce disciplinary rules except with reference to civil liability,
it seems at least possible that the SEC might revoke the registration of an exchange
for violation of the duty thus established.41
In any event, despite the passage of the Act the exchanges are still free to adopt
and enforce any rule not inconsistent with the Act4 Moreover, "when an exchange
does take disciplinary action against a member, the Commission has no jurisdiction
to review that action administratively." 43 The traditional limited review of such
actions by the courts remains unchanged 4
The powers of the exchanges with respect to the listing of securities are even
less affected by the Act than disciplinary proceedings. Section ig(b) (3) of the Act
gives the SEC power to alter or supplement the rules of an exchange relating
to listing if the exchange refuses to adopt the SEC's recommendation with respect
thereto, but this power has apparently never been exercised. It is characterized by
Mr. Loss as a "residual power."45
"' This recommendation and its background are summarized in SEC, TENTu ANN. R P. 18-19 (1944).
40 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 328 U .S. 737 (1944).
"t See Louis Loss, SEcuRrsas REGULA'nON 633 (595i). This scholarly treatise is an indispensable
reference in the securities field. To avoid repetition we will cite this work only when we would
invite attention to a specific passage therein.
"Sec. 6(c). 'Loss, SacuairTrs REGuLA'rON 633.
ild.
Id. at 487; see id. at 487-491 for a discussion of the non-statutory listing requirements of various
stock exchanges.
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THE OVER-THE-CouNTER MARKET
When we turn from the exchange to the over-the-counter market we find quite
a different situation.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 left the over-the-counter market but slightly
affected, even after important amendments to Section 15 of that Act in 1936. In
substance, the SEC was simply given very general power to control fraudulent
conduct in the over-the-counter market.46
Obviously this left quite unregulated, in the over-the-counter market, the whole
area of business ethics in the relation between members of the business and between
members and their customers which the exchanges have traditionally regulated. A
movement quickly developed to bring into the over-the-counter market regulation
similar to that which the exchanges provide for their members47
Under the NRA there had been a code regulating the ethics of over-the-counter
brokers and dealers. Following the invalidation of the NIRA, the SEC and repre-
sentatives of those in the business cooperated in seeking legislation which would
make it possible to resume such regulation4 8 The legislation was adopted in 1938.
It added to the Securities Exchange Act a new section, x5A, known as the Maloney
Act from the name of its sponsor, Senator Maloney. It was introduced in Congress
at the SEC's request.49 It represented a deliberate choice by Congress between two
alternatives: greatly expanding the powers and functions of the SEC, providing for
regulation of business ethics by an agency of the state; or providing for regulation
by the businessmen themselves through their own association or associations which
would have power over their members comparable to the power of an exchange.
Congress, explicitly recognizing the choice, chose the latter alternative. 0
When the Maloney Act was adopted, it was hoped by some that a number of
different affiliated associations would appear, including groups specializing in par-
ticular types of securities 1 or organized on a regional basis.52 This did not happen.
Only one association has been registered under the Act, the nationwide National
Association of Securities Dealers,53 which was formed and incorporated in response
"SEC, TENTH ANN. REP. 44 (1944)- 'SEC, FOURTH ANN. R'EP. 32-33 (1938).
'See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 36-37 (1938).
' PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June i, 1945 (see p. 6x, n. 8, of the Release). There was strong in-
dustry support for the legislation. 83 CoNo. REc. 4451 (1938); Hearings before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3255 and H. R. 9634, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938). One
reason for industry support was the feeling that the SEC tended to favor the organized exchanges "at
the expense of the unorganized markets." Comment, 48 YALE L. J. 633, 649 (1939). Such a tendency
might well be inevitable with no effective regulation in the over-the-counter market. See also SEN.
REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Seas. 2-3 (1938), and H.R. RPt. No. 2307, 7 5 th Cong., 3 d Sess, 3-4
(1938).
" SEN. RaP. No. 1455, supra; H. R. RaP. No. 2307, supra, at 4. See Loss, SECURIIES RGULATION
762 et seq.; Comment, 48 YALE L. J. 633 (1939); PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June ri, 1945 (see p.
61, n. 8, of the Release). There was no opposition to the legislation in Congress. 83 CONG. REc. 4447-
4461, 9444-9446 (1938).
"SEC, FiF- ANN. REP. 58 (1939).
" Comment, 48 YALE L J. 633, 649 (1939).
"DeWitt Investment Company, Release No. 4076, April 14, 1948 (see pp. 7-8 of the Release).
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SECURiTIES Busmirmss
to the adoption of the Maloney Act. In considering the provisions of the Act, there-
fore, we may consider it as though it were simply a provision for and regulation
of the NASD. 4
The Maloney Act provides that the association may be registered with the SEC.5
To be registered, it must appear to the SEC that the NASD's rules provide that any
broker-dealer dealing in securities otherwise than on an exchange may become a
member of the NASD unless he falls in specified disqualified classes."6 Those
classes include, among others, persons who are suspended or expelled from an
exchange or from the NASD for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade. A person in a disqualified class may be admitted to membership
only if the SEC directs or approves. t The NASD's rules must also assure fair
representation of its members in the adoption of its rules and in the administration of
its affairs."' Its rules must be designed to prevent fraud, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to prevent unreasonable profits or charges, and to
promote a free market; and they must not be designed to permit unfair discrimina-
tion, to fix minimum profits or charges, or to impose any schedule of prices.59 The
rules must also provide for disciplining of members for their violation60 Dis-
ciplinary proceedings must be fair, with notice and hearing.61
The Act further provides that if any disciplinary action is taken by the NASD,
or if an application for membership is denied, such action shall be subject to review
by the SEC upon its own motion or upon application by an aggrieved person.
Pending such review, the NASD action is stayed.62 Rules adopted by the NASD
from time to time must be filed with the SEC and may be disapproved by it.
63
The SEC may suspend or revoke the registration of the NASD if it is found to
have failed to enforce compliance with its own rules or engages in any activity
tending to defeat the purposes of the Maloney Act.64 Likewise the SEC may
suspend or expel from the NASD any member found to have violated the Securities
Exchange Act or to have willfully violated the Securities Act 5
The teeth of the Maloney Act appear in subsections (i) and (n) of Section i5 A.
The former permits the NASD rules to provide that no member shall deal with a
non-member "except at the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on
the same terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the general
public." Subsection (n) provides that if there is any conflict between the Maloney
Act and any other law of the United States in force on the date the Maloney Act
took effect, then the Maloney Act "shall prevail." Thus it is provided that, despite
"The Maloney Act and the NASD are fully discussed in Loss, SEcuRiTIs REoGuLmAON 762-784.
See also Grant, The National Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin and Operation, [1942] WVs.
L. REv. 597; Cherrington, National Association of Securities Dealers, 27 HAav. Bus. REv. 741 (949).
Cf. Lesh, Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers, 59 HtAv. L. REv. 1237 (1946).
" Sec. i5A(a). " See p. 530, infra.
" Sec. s5 A(b)(3), x5A(b)(4). See Loss, SECuRiIES REGuLATION 774-775.
"s Sec. i5A(b) (5). 9Sec- isA(b) (7)- "0Sec. i5A(b) (8).
': Sec. 5A(b)(9). "Sec. 15A(g); see infra p. 534. " Sec. 15A(J); cf. §I5A(k).
,Sec. i5A(I); cf. §isA( 3 ). "Sec. 15 A(2). See Loss, S~cuRTrias Ro GtLATIoN 782.
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antitrust laws,66 the NASD may adopt rules requiring its members to deny dealers'
and other concessions to non-members. The NASD has adopted such rules. There-
fore, if a broker-dealer wishes to participate in an underwriting or otherwise to en-
joy concessions which, generally, are necessary to any substantial over-the-counter
business, he must be an NASD member and maintain himself in good standing.
An exchange is able to exercise power because of the value of having access to a
seat on the exchange. The NASD is able to exercise power in the over-the-counter
business only because of the foregoing privilege to deny concessions to non-members."7
The NASD functions through a national Board of Governors which has the
power to adopt rules of ethics subject to ratification by a majority vote of the mem-
bers voting, provided that a majority of the members vote. Disciplinary proceedings
are initiated by committees in the various local districts of the NASD, called Dis-
trict Business Conduct Committees, whose decisions are subject to review by the
Board of Governors either upon the initiative of that Board or upon appeal by a
disciplined member.
Curiously, the Maloney Act made no specific provision for the exercise of power
by the NASD over officers or employees of members. The defect was remedied by
an adoption of rules, by the NASD, several years after it was organized, which
provide, in effect, that every officer or partner of a member, and any employee of
a member who is in a position of responsibility or who deals with the public, must
become a "registered representative" with the NASD, and that the NASD shall
have the same power over a registered representative as over a member. By a some-
what strained, but practical, course of reasoning the SEC sustained the validity
of this rule under the Act and found that it would have the same power to review
NASD disciplinary action with respect to registered representatives as it has with
respect to NASD members."8
"Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926); cl. Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926).
"TComment, 48 YALE L. J. 633, 644-646 (1939). One firm whose NASD membership was
temporarily suspended alleged that a fourth of the business "it would ordinarily do" could not be done
while suspended from the NASD. E. H. Rollings & Sons, Inc., Release No. 3683, April xS8, 1945. NASD
membership is essential to participate in underwritings and distributions. PSI Case, Release No. 3700,
June ix, 1945 (see p. 20 of Release). See also Sherman Gleason, 15 S.E.C. 639, 654 (x944); Lawrence
R. Leeby, Release No. 3898, Jan. 6, 1947 (see p. 4 of Release); Dewitt Investment Company, Release No.
4076, April 14, 1948 (see p. 8 of Release); Loss, SFcuTias REGULAT5ON 769-770. There is no doubt
that Congress meant that the NASD's power to boycott should be a real sanction, quite like an exchange's
power to expel a member; its committees said: ". . . it is contemplated that exclusion from membership
in a registered securities association will be attended and implemented by economic sanctions. In this
respect, exclusion from such an association would be comparable in effect to expulsion from a national
securities exchange. It is these economic sanctions which would make possible effective discipline within
the association." SE. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1938), H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 9 (2938).
"
8 Re NASD, Release No. 3734, Sept. I9, 1945. The SEC's reasoning by which it found that it would
have such review power raises some difficult and technical questions beyond the scope of this article. See
Loss. SFcunars REGTU AtON 768. However as to the reasonableness of the NASD's assertion of power
over registered representatives there could be no doubt. Thus it was pointed out by the SEC that sales-
men involved in misconduct while employed by one NASD member might switch their employment "and
attempt to carry on the same practices in their new employment" (see p. 3 of Release No. 3734).
SELF-GovERNMENT IN THE SECURITIES BusINEss
The NASD registered with the SEC in i939.69 There have been only about
twenty-five cases where the SEC has been called upon to pass on any NASD rule-
making, disciplinary, or membership action. But in that body of precedent we find
an instructive treatment of the problem of integrating the social controls of a private
agency with those of the state.
In the first place, there must be a considerable degree of cooperation between
the NASD and the SEC. The SEC, occupied with a wide range of complex prob-
lems, frequently invites the advice and the assistance of the NASD in the formula-
tion of policies and administrative measures affecting the over-the-counter business.
In addition, the SEC has from the beginning referred to the NASD disciplinary
matters which come to its attention ° Thus when its examiners uncover evidence
of conduct violating the NASD rules the SEC may refer such violations to the
NASD for its consideration. 7 Such references do not always result in action; nor
does it follow that a reference which is acted upon necessarily results in an NASD
determination that there has been a violation. The NASD has functioned with
striking independence, and has resolutely resisted any tendency to become a mere
arm of the SEC 2
This raises a fundamental question. Does the NASD, and the body of rules or
"law" it adopts and administers, derive force from the state; or is it, like the ex-
changes, a purely private organization, subject to the restraints of the state only
when it oversteps bounds? The question appears academic; but on occasion it may
be important in the resolution of specific issues. In one of its most important cases,
in the course of its argument to the SEC, the NASD urged that it derived its
powers from the law of the state of its incorporation, like any other private corpora-
tion, and that its action should be reviewed on that premise rather than as though
it were carrying out some power delegated by Congress. One of the Commissioners
insisted that, if the SEC affirmed the NASD decision, a governmental sanction
would be added to the decision of the NASD. Thus, he concluded, the NASD
rules "have ceased to be merely private rules of conduct for members of a private
association. They have become, in addition, the primary standards to guide de-
cisions of an agency of the government in carrying out a statutory responsibility. ' 73
Here there is suggested a very vital consideration, though one rarely touched
upon in the SEC opinions dealing with the NASD. Congress, in the Maloney Act,
determined that it wished to rely upon the processes of a private agency to exercise
social control; in effect, it determined that a state agency operating in the field in
question was too unwieldy, expensive, and awkward. Does it follow that, in the
exercise of its functions, the private agency is to be treated as though it were a com-
pletely private agency, subject only to the specific restraints spelled out by the
e Re NASD, 5 S. E. C. 627 (1939).
'o See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 781-782.
"XSEC Sixrss ANN. REp. xo9-io (1940); SEC FIFTEENTH ANN. REp. 6 (949).
"'Cf. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 783.
"PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June Ir, 1945 (see p. 49 of the Release; see also p. 14 n. r7).
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Congress; or is it to be treated as though it were itself an agency of government,
importing the procedural and substantive standards which usually are applicable
to government action? The value of having a private agency could be destroyed
if it were required to function according to the same standards and with the same
formality as apply in the case of a state agency.
74
Fundamental to the operation of the NASD is its democratic character.
An exchange probably can deny membership to anyone-just as can an ordinary
club. 5 Although theoretically this springs from the physical limitations of an ex-
change, in practice what it means is that there is an effective restraint upon the
number of competitors who may operate in the exchange market. However like
an exchange the NASD was intended to be, the SEC has been alert to forestall in the
NASD any trace of this fundamental characteristic of an exchange. 70  With some
justification the NASD interpreted the Act as permitting it to deny membership to
one who was not "regularly engaged in the business of broker and dealer," and had
so provided in its bylaws. On that ground it denied membership to one who had
the mere shell of an office and in the course of several years had effected a total
of only seven securities transactions with customers. The SEC reversed. The Act,
it insisted, meant that membership must be open to all, save those specifically dis-
qualified. The "quantitatively limited" extent of an applicant's business could
be no bar; the SEC emphasized the fact that the NASD is the only association
organized under the Act and pointed out that membership in it is necessary to
"expansion in various branches of the business." If, said the SEC, lack of patronage
or financial success were to be a bar to membership, then only those "already on the
scene" would be able to enjoy the benefits of NASD membership. 77
In another connection the SEC reached the same conclusion in an even closer
case. When the NASD was first registered, the SEC had approved registration
with a caveat that there should be some requirement to secure the solvency of its
members "lest the public be misled into thinking that membership . .. in any way
connotes solvency."78  Later the NASD adopted a bylaw amendment providing
"' Compare pp. 534-540, infra. The speed with which the NASD acts in the disposition of disciplinary
proceedings is remarkable. The record, in the case of the 71 complaints most recently disposed of, as of
January 1, 1952, shows an average time of 6.2 months from the filing of the complaint until final dis-
position. Of the 71 cases, 62 were finally disposed of at the District level; their average time from the
filing of complaint to disposition was 5.6 months. In the case of the 9 which were reviewed by the
Board of Governors, the average time from initiation in the District to disposition by the Board was so.z
months. These figures have been computed by us from data supplied by the NASD.
" Testimony of Commissioner Mathews, in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 3255, 7 5 th Cong., 3 d Sess. 7 (1938). Chas. F. Garrigues Co. v. New York Produce
Exchange, 213 App. Div. 625, 211 N. Y. Supp. 13 (ist Dep't 1925).
"See Loss, ScuaRias REourt.TION 776.
"'Dewitt Investment Company, Release.No. 4076, April 14, 1948. In the same case the SEC held
that expulsion from an exchange prior to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act did not constitute
a disqualification from NASD membership, although the Maloney Act provided that one could not be
accepted by the NASD, without SEC approval, if he had been expelled from an exchange. The point
decided was a narrow one of statutory interpretation, but the decision illustrates the SEC's expansive
view of the right to join the NASD. But 4f. J. A. Sisto & C., 7 S. E. C. 1102, 1103 (1940).
7" Re NASD, 5 S. E. C. 627, 632 (1939).
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that a member should have a specified minimum net capital, and the amendment
was submitted to the SEC. After a hearing, as required by the Act, at which
several NASD members appeared in opposition, the SEC rejected the amendment
as being inconsistent with the Act.79  Although the amendment had been informally
discussed with the SEC prior to its adoption, and had been viewed "favorably"
by the SEC, upon reflection the SEC determined that it could not be squared with
the Act because it would exclude persons from membership solely because of the
size of their capital8 °
Dicta in these decisions, considered apart from the language of the Act, leave
room for argument that the NASD could use its power to refuse membership as a
means for assuring responsibility among over-the-counter broker-dealers. Thus, in
referring to the legislative history of the Act, the SEC quoted language to the effect
that anyone "who is willing to conduct his business decently" should be eligible.8 '
And in the DeWitt case8"" it pointedly recognized the importance of maintaining
high standards in the business. But the language of the Act itself is sweeping. 2
One can only observe that, unless an agency such as the NASD can screen applicants
to some extent, at least under governmental supervision, it lacks a most effective
instrument for accomplishing its mission.
3
Not only must NASD membership be broadly available, but the processes of
democracy are assured in NASD rule-making. The Act requires that there be
"Re NASD, 12 S. E. C. 322 (1942).
"Id. at 325, 326. According to the SEC's opinion, the effect of the NASD rule would have
been drastic; it might have resulted in expulsion of more than a quarter of the NASD membership. The
SEC stated that a specific requirement for minimum capital was rejected by the Senate Committee
during the consideration of the Maloney Act. Id. at 325-326. Recognizing that there was need
for an assurance of solvency of over-the-counter broker-dealers, after this mistaken step by the NASD
the SEC announced that it would itself propose its own rule requiring maintainance of a specified
ratio between indebtedness and capital, modeled upon a similar rule written into the Act with respect
to exchange members, which would not make mere size of capital decisive. Id. at 327, 329.
81 ld. at 325.
"a Supra note 77.
See p. 527 supra. Nonetheless the legislative committees explained the Act as requiring that all "who
conduct an honest and responsible business shall be eligible for membership. ... SEN. REP. No. 1455,
7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938); H. R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-7 (1938).
"5 When one in the disqualified categories specified in the Act seeks admission or readmission to the
NASD there is no doubt of the power-indeed the duty-of the NASD to scrutinize the applicant
with care. The controlling partner of J. A. Sisto & Company was expelled from the New York Stock
Exchange in 1938, making the firm ineligible for NASD membership. In 1944, when it sought such
membership, the NASD took favorable action, subject to SEC approval, upon a record which
consisted merely of the firm's application and related correspondence. The record, in this state,
showed nothing but the passage of time. The SEC refused approval, stating that: "An applicant
within the exclusionary categories . . . is under a duty to present facts to justify its admission to
membership. . . . If an applicant cannot demonstrate fitness to exercise the responsibilities and to
enjoy the benefits of membership . . . the purpose of the statute would be contravened if we directed or
approved its membership." J. A. Sisto & Co., Release No. 3614, Nov. a, 1944 (see pp. 3-4 of the
Release). See also J. A. Sisto & Co., 7 S. E. C. 647, 1102 (1940). Several years later the NASD de-
veloped a record and again recommended acceptance of membership. This time, the SEC observed
that the mere passage of time would require a fresh review of the circumstances. It reviewed the facts
brought out before the NASD with respect to the firm's good conduct during the years since its earlier
faulty conduct, and approved the NASD's determination. J. A. Sisto & Co., Release No. 4142, July 29,
1948.
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"fair representation of its members in the adoption of any rule." 4  The NASD
bylaws require that its rules of ethics be ratified by vote of its members. Originally
this vote was conducted by open ballot. In passing upon a rule to which there was
considerable opposition within the membership, the SEC remarked that "as a matter
of hindsight" it would seem that "a secret ballot would have been preferable." '
And even after a secret ballot procedure was adopted, the SEC has remarked that
"it seems reasonable to assume" that opponents of a rule could have representatives
present at the tallying."8
The SEC has likewise indicated some tendency to emphasize the autonomy which
District Business Conduct Committees enjoy under the NASD bylaws.17 The bylaws
permit the Board of Governors to issue interpretations of the rules, and in one
notable instance the Board adopted an elaborate interpretation to the effect that
unreasonably high prices charged a customer would be deemed inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade, inviting attention to the fact that a survey
showed that no more than a 5 per cent profit or mark-up was made by members in
the great majority of their transactions. This interpretation was followed by a letter
from the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Director of the NASD to the
various District Business Conduct Committees strongly implying that Committees
should bring proceedings against a member in any case where a profit of more than
5 per cent was secured. In the course of discussing the legal effect and justification of
this letter, the SEC remarked: "The institution of formal proceedings against mem-
bers is a local matter, and the committees are free to apply their own judgment for
determining when to bring disciplinary proceedings."88
However great the power of the NASD, therefore, the organization has a strongly
democratic character. Membership cannot be restricted. Membership control of
rule-making is assured, with emphasis upon the secret ballot. And there is sub-
stantial local autonomy in determining whether disciplinary measures are to be in-
stituted.
Equally fundamental is the insistence of the Act and the SEC that the NASD
actually enforce its rules. The Act requires that there be rules governing business
ethics which must provide that the members "shall be appropriately disciplined, by
expulsion, suspension, fine, censure, or any other fitting penalty, for any violation"
of the rules."9 The SEC is empowered by Section i5A(l) (i) to suspend or revoke
the NASD's registration if it finds that the NASD has "failed to enforce com-
pliance with its own rules ... -"o Although the SEC has never had occasion to
:' Sec. i5A(b)(5). "5 Re NASD, 12 S. E. C. 322, 323 (1942).
'6 Re NASD, Release No. 3734, Sept. 19, 1945 (see p. x5 of the Release).
:" Cf. Comment, 48 YaLE L. J. 633, 649 (939).
'
8 Re NASD, 17 S. E. C. 459, 468 (1944). "'Sec. x5A(b)(8).
'In this respect the Act imposes a stricter-or at least a much plainer-duty on the NASD than on
stock exchanges. Cf. p. 525 supra.
It is also significant that the duty to adopt and enforce rules has not been imposed in other cases
where Congress has provided for a certain amount of self-government. Steamship companies, airlines,
and railroads are privileged to varying extents to adopt agreements, free of antitrust restraint, which
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take any action implementing this duty, it has evidenced unmistakably that it is
alert to the NASD's responsibility and that it would not be likely long to tolerate
any tendency on the part of the NASD to slight its enforcement function. It is
very clear that the NASD is not a mere trade association or service agency.9 '
At the very outset, when the NASD applied for registration under the Act, it
had no plans for a paid investigatory staff; apparently, initially, it contemplated the
possibility of relying entirely upon voluntary committees to administer its rules. Of
this the SEC pointedly observed that "it would appear doubtful whether effective
enforcement of the association's rules of fair practice could be secured" and that a
paid staff would be necessary. 2 Pointed also was the SEC's comment on the pro-
posed schedule of dues; it remarked that they did not seem enough "to enable the
association to perform the task of cooperative regulation, which naturally includes
adequate self-policing, except to a limited extent" and it proposed to scrutinize
the NASD's record closely.93  In its Annual Report for the next year, the SEC
noted: "The investigations of complaints conducted by local business conduct
committees of the association have been followed with especial care."94 And in the
following year the SEC noted that the NASD would be in a position to conduct
"its own investigations in a greater number of instances, since it increased its paid
staff materially," and spoke approvingly of the NASD's abandonment of a policy of
taking action only when complaints came to it in favor of a policy of taking the
initiative in the investigation of its members and the institution of complaints;
this, said the SEC, was "a distinct step forward" and "should prove of real assistance
to the Commission in meeting its problem of policing the . . . over-the-counter
houses scattered throughout the land."9  In its Annual Reports the SEC has in-
cluded data indicating the disposition by the NASD of disciplinary matters referred
to it by the SEC staff.96
In short-and this is a point which has been deeply impressed upon the NASD
and its leadership, if not upon all of its members-the Maloney Act is not merely a
grant of an opportunity for self-government; though the over-the-counter houses
were not required to form the NASD, once formed it must govern. As long as the
NASD is adhered to by a sufficient number of the over-the-counter houses to make
provide a limited self-regulation in those industries; but in providing such a privilege Congress imposed
no such duty to govern as it has imposed on the NASD. Shipping Act of 1916, Sec. 15, 39 STAT. 733
(19x6), as amended, 46 U. S. C. §814 (1946); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Secs. 412, 44, 52 STAT.
1004 (938), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§492, 494 (946); and the Bulwinkle-Reed Act of 1948, 62 STAT.
472, 49 U. S. C. §5b (Supp. 195)-
"' This is not to say that the NASD does not engage in many service functions. Its service functions,
indeed, are more extensive than in the case of the usual trade association. They include provision of a
voluntary arbitration service, provision of a group insurance plan for members and their employees,
nationwide dissemination of daily quotations or price ranges of unlisted securities, publication of a trade
paper, liaison with government agencies, and other services.
"
2 Re NASD, 5 S. E. C. 627, 628 (1939).
" Id. at 631.
"SEC, Sixrsi ANN. REP. io9 (1940).
" SEC, SEVENTH ANN. RaP. 152-153 (1941).
0 E.g., SEC, FIPTEENTH ANN. REP. (1949).
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it economically necessary for broker-dealers to become and remain NASD members,
the business has no choice but to subject itself to its own policing.
The SEC's emphasis upon the NASD's duty to adopt and enforce a code of
ethics quite naturally raises the question of the extent to which the SEC will accept
the NASD's decisions. Sec. i5A(k) empowers the SEC to abrogate any NASD
rule if abrogation is appropriate "to protect investors." Moreover, any NASD rule
must be filed with the SEC to take effect thirty days thereafter unless disapproved
by the SEC as inconsistent with the statutory mandate that the association's rules
be designed "to protect investors and the public interest." 7 It is likewise provided
that any disciplinary action taken by the NASD shall be subject to review by the
SEC upon petition of an aggrieved party or on the SEC's initiative. Review in-
cludes the record before the NASD "and such other evidence as it [the SEC] may
deem relevant" and is to be directed to the questions (a) whether the disciplined
person committed the wrong of which he was found guilty, (b) whether the act
committed was a violation of the NASD rule designated "in the determination of
the association," and (c) whether the penalty imposed was "excessive or oppressive."08
Without getting into the technicalities of the statutory language providing for
this review, it is obvious that it is important to know whether the SEC review is
completely de novo. Analogies suggest themselves: the extent of the review by an
appellate court of a trial court's decision and the extent of the review by a court of the
action of an administrative body. The extremely limited court review of the
discipline imposed by exchanges has already been noted. 9
There is some evidence that the SEC recognizes a kind of presumption in favor
of the NASD's judgment with respect to the exercise of its rule-making function.
Section 22 of the Investment .Company Act of 1940 provided that an association
registered with the SEC under the Maloney Act-meaning the NASD-could
adopt certain rules in accordance with the Maloney Act regulating dealings by its
members in investment company shares. It was further provided that, after
the lapse of one year, the SEC could adopt regulations governing the same subject.
The NASD did adopt elaborate rules which were duly filed with the SEC. In
permitting them to go into effect, the SEC announced that it was not called upon
to imply "in any way that they are adequate to solve the problems to which they
relate."' 0  And, in discussing certain objections which had been made on the
ground that one of the rules would discriminate against some dealers, the SEC
stated that it was not clear that there would be unfair discrimination, and added,
"... as it stands the effect of the rule is doubtful and we feel that under the cir.
cumstances the doubt should be resolved in favor of the viewpoint of the Associa-
tion."'' (In fact, the NASD's rules are still in force and the SEC has never adopted
rules of its own.)
It was apparent, of course, that in the Investment Company Act the Congress
" Sec. 15A,(j), " Sec. 15A(g), (h). "' See pp. 519-522 supra.
...Re NASD, 9 S. E. C. 38, 43 (1941). 10 11d. at 45.
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meant to give the industry a chance, through its own association, to regulate itself. 0 2
But the same intention was evident in the Maloney Act itself, 03 and the Investment
Company Act made the NASD rules subject to all the provisions of the Maloney
Act. Hence the SEC's views expressed in this instance should be applicable to any
other rule adopted by the NASD.
Thus far there has been no evidence of a presumption in favor of the NASD in
SEC opinions reviewing NASD disciplinary action against its members. In an
individual opinion by one of the Commissioners there is a note that he does not
believe that the SEC is bound by the findings of fact made by the NASD 0 4 Yet
in commenting upon the function of the disciplinary tribunals of the NASD the
SEC has been at pains to state that,0 5
S.. the proceeding is heard by the accused member's fellow businessmen who are supposed
to bring their knowledge of trade practices to bear upon the case, and make their de-
termination in the light of their experience as technicians in the securities markets rather
than as lay jurors or legalistic judges.
. . . trade practice cases within the NASD are heard by the accused member's fellow
businessmen who are supposed to approach each case as experienced members of the
trade, familiar with its problems and practices.
If this is true-and the statement reflects very clearly the congressional purpose
in adopting the Maloney Act'° 6 -there must be an "expertise" in the NASD to be
given effect by the SEC through a presumption akin to that lent by a court to the
expert determination of an administrative body. Failure of the SEC thus far to
articulate such a presumption is probably due to the absence of occasion therefor
rather than to any reluctance to do so. Indeed there have been several cases where
the SEC obviously was relying upon the NASD's judgment, instead of exercising its
own independently, in situations quite like disciplinary proceedings. Under the
Act, where a broker-dealer is in a disqualified category because of a previous ex-
"'Id. at 42; SEC, SEVENTrs ANN. REP. 153-154 (94).
... When the NASD was about to be organized the SEC commented, "In order that every reasonable
opportunity may be afforded such association or associations as may become registered with the Com-
mission to exercise as broad a regulatory function as possible, the Commission has refrained from any
substantial amplification of its own rules for regulation of over-the-counter markets." SEC, Fisi-H
ANN. REP. 58 (1939).
'PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June I1, 1945 (see p. 65 n. 13 of the Release). Compare Stewart,
Release No. 3720, Aug. 7, 1945, where the SEC sustained disciplinary action taken by the NASD.
Its opinion states that: "Our findings are based upon an independent review of the record, which includes
the record developed in the proceedings before the NASD." See also, R. H. Johnson & Co., Release No.
4694, April 2, 1952 (see p. 2 of the Release).
'
0 Re NASD, X7 S. E. C. 459, 468, 470 (1944).
"" See remarks of Senator Maloney, 83 CoNG. Rae. 4451 (938). In his testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, where he was presenting the case in support of the
Maloney Act, Commissioner Mathews observed: ". . . even if the funds were furnished for a direct
government regulatory program, and even if an adequate staff were provided, and even if there were no
problems of securing enforcement through the courts . . . a great many of the abuses in the securities
business are not matters of definite illegality; they are matters of ethics .... There is a vast field for
the control of ethical practices in this business, which is not a field which the Government can very
well occupy" (italics supplied). Hearings before the Senate Committee oft Banking and Currency on
S. 3255, 7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess. so (1938).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
pulsion from the NASD or otherwise, he cannot be accepted as an NASD member
without approval or direction by the SEC; similarly, a person who seeks to become
a registered representative of a member, but who is under a similar disqualification,
cannot become such without SEC action. Ordinarily, there is first an application
to the NASD in such cases. Where the NASD makes a record on the case, and
does exercise its judgment upon that record, the SEC's opinions indicate a strong
tendency to accept the NASD's judgment.' 07
Certainly there is nothing in the Act that requires the SEC to exercise its judg-
ment de novo. It is true that on appeal to the SEC in a disciplinary proceeding
the Act provides that it may receive additional evidence,... but it does not follow
that in a doubtful case either of fact or of principle the SEC is to decide a proposi-
tion as though the NASD had not spoken' 0o9 Especially is this true with respect to
the question whether the penalty imposed by the NASD should be sustained; in
fact the Act seems to contemplate a very considerable measure of discretion in the
NASD on that issue, for the SEC's function is to determine whether the penalty is
'"excessive or oppressive"--not to determine what it would have done on its own.
Support for the view that the SEC should resolve doubts in favor of the NASD's
judgment is to be found in its insistence that the NASD actually hear and determine
cases and that evidence be presented in the first instance to the NASD-a doctrine
similar to that applied by the courts in reviewing administrative action. This
doctrine almost necessarily implies the view that, where the administrative agency
has heard and decided on the evidence, its judgment is not to be reviewed de novo
in court.
In one case, involving an expelled member's application for reinstatement, the
NASD had denied the application without any statement of its reasons. In over-
ruling the NASD, the SEC stated that, while the NASD had "complied with the
formal mechanics" of procedure, "its action lacks the very essence envisaged by the
statutory procedure, namely, an informative statement of its reasons.... ." The SEC
added:110
If the NASD is to fulfill the responsibility imposed upon it by the statute and if its
decisions are to serve as an aid to us in determining what action to take, they must be
based on findings which state plainly the reasons for the NASD's action.
"7 This is reflected in some such phrase as, "After consideration of all the circumstances, and giving
due weight to the recommendation of the NASD . 0. " .H. -:ccht, Release No. 4562, Feb. 2, 1951.
See also William L. Johnsen, Release No. 41z6, July 13, 1948; H. L. Ruppert and Joseph H. Lynch,
Release No. 4117, July 13, 1948; J. A. Sisto & Company, Release No. 4142, July 29, 1948.
Io Compare pp. 537-538, infra.
1"' Mr. Loss states that ". . . the Commission's review of the Association's action is broader than the
judicial review of the Commission's action in that the Commission may review de novo, 'upon considera-
tion of the record before the association and such other evidence as it may deem relevant.'" SECrUlREs
REoU.ATON 772-773. If Mr. Loss means that the Commission may review de novo in the sense that
it may receive new evidence, then his statement and our statement are not in disagreement. But if he
means that the Commission may review the NASD's findings and conclusions on the basis of a de novo
appraisal of the record made before the NASD, then he is going further than the language of the Act
requires-and he cites no authority except the language of the Act.
.. Lawrence R. Leeby, Release No. 3898, Jan. 6, 1947-
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In another case, despite the fact that the NASD Board of Governors had given
de noto review to disciplinary action taken by a District Committee, and had sus-
tained such action, the SEC took cognizance of infirmities in the District Com-
mittee's procedure. It insisted that the decisions of such committees "ought to be
supported not merely by peremptory conclusions, but by articulated findings and
a reasoned consideration of the relevant facts of the case.""' And in still another-
case, where a member was charged with excessive mark-ups to its customers, the.
SEC seems to have said that it found the NASD's opinion wanting in that it failed
to disclose whether "consideration" was given by the NASD to certain evidence,
offered by the member which the member argued had a bearing upon the ethics
of its conduct."
2
Here then we find the SEC apparently insisting that the NASD actually make
findings and disclose in a written statement that it has given consideration to the
arguments advanced, whether or not it agrees with such arguments. While the
precedents are sketchy, they suggest the elaborate body of doctrine built up by the
courts with respect to the need for full findings from an administrative agency in,
cases where a hearing is required." 3
Other requirements normally attaching to a hearing in the case of government
agencies have been suggested in SEC opinions. Thus where it was contended that
a District Committee had been "dominated" by its secretary, who had taken a dim
view of the appearance of counsel before the Committee and in certain respects had
run the Committee in a high-handed manner, the SEC commented:14
Business conduct committees, sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity, are in the difficult and
vulnerable position of businessmen trying a competitor. Under such circumstances, they
are bound to observe the highest standards of fair procedure. In so doing, they must
not in any way discourage or abridge a respondents exercise of any right which their
rules afford or which simple justice demands, including the right to counsel. They
should take every reasonable step necessary to insure that their deliberations are not affected
by the personal prejudices of any of the participants in the proceeding.
Reflecting even more strongly the traditional view taken by the courts in review-
ing action of administrative agencies is an opinion by the SEC in one case testing
the provision of the Act that, on the SEC's review, it shall consider not only the
""' Sherman Gleason, 15 S. E. C. 639, 648 (1944).
.. Herrick, Waddell & Co., Release No. 3935, Mar. 25, 1947 (see p. ii of the Release). See also
Sherman Gleason, x5 S. E. C. 639, 648-649 (1944).
... In one rather curious case the SEC sustained a penalty which it felt not excessive for one viola-
tion, although the NASD itself had predicated the penalty upon that violation plus two others which the
SEC found not to warrant punishment. Sherman Gleason, 15 S. E. C. 639, 65o-65i, 654 (944). This
suggests that the NASD might be upheld in some circumstances even if it gives the wrong reason for its
action.
""' Sherman Gleason, 15 S. E. C. 639, 648 (1944). In the same case the SEC commented that two
of the violations of which the -respondent had been found guilty by the NASD had not been charged
in the complaint filed against him. For other reasons, however, it held that these alleged violations did
not warrant a penalty; the SEC did not determine the procedural question whether a finding of a
violation may be sustained where the violation in question was not charged in the original complaint.
x5 S.E.C. at 649-651.
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NASD record but also "such other evidence as it may deem relevant." ' The case
dealt with a finding by a District Committee that a member had been guilty of
excessive mark-ups to its customers; the Board of Governors had affirmed by an
evenly divided vote. Before the SEC, the member moved for permission to adduce
evidence of its policy to make full disclosure of its mark-ups to its customers, showing
what it had done in this respect since the occurrence of the alleged violations. The
SEC held that evidence of what had been done after the alleged violations could not
be relevant, but then proceeded with this revealing passage:1 6
The experience of our judicial system has demonstrated that, to the extent that review
is limited to the record before the lower tribunal, there is more complete preparation by
the parties, a clearer delineation of issues, and substantial simplification in the task of a
review. Moreover, fairness to the original tribunal requires that it be given the opportu-
nity to consider all available evidence in making its decision. In general, therefore, the
Commssion will not open the record to receive further evidence except in a case where
it is shown that such evidence is relevant to the issues raised but could not be presented in
the original proceedings.
And in the same case at a later stage, after the SEC had determined that the NASD
had unduly limited the scope of its inquiry at its hearing, the SEC considered
whether to take additional evidence and dispose of the case; it decided that the
better course was that of remanding the case to the NASD for further proceedings .lT
If, as these opinions indicate, the SEC attaches importance to an articulation of
the reasons for the NASD's action, is insistent upon the guarantees of a "fair hear-
ing," and will not let parties short-cut the NASD by withholding evidence until
they reach the SEC, then a very strong presumption should attach to the NASD's
action once it has been taken in accordance with the "due process" contemplated by
'15 See p. 536, itupra.
11. Herrick, Waddell & Co., Release No. 3831, July 11, 1946. Cf. J. A. Sisto & Co., Release No.
3614, Nov. i, 1944. The statement quoted in the text finds support in the common-law rule governing
the granting of new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 39 Am. JUR. New Trial §§556-
16x. A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence requires a showing of due
diligence. FED. R. Civ. P. 5 9 (a)(b), 6o(b); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§59.02, 60.02 (1938). Ad-
ministrative agencies require a similar showing. See, e.g., INTERSTATE COMMERCE ComMIssioN RULES
OF PRAc:TcE ioi(b). Unless it finds a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse the
denial of a new trial by a trial court, Brown v. Schwartz, 164 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1947); United States
v. Bransen, 142 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1944); or the denial of a rehearing by an administrative agency.
ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944); Lang Transportation Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915
(S. D. Cal. X948); Carolina Scenic Coach Lines v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 336 (D. N. C. '945),
af9'd, 326 U. S. 68o (1945). New evidence not presented to an administrative agency will not be received
by a court reviewing the agency's decision. Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 443-445 (1930).
Nor will an appellate court ordinarily consider new issues of fact or law on appeal from the decision of
a lower court, Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Friedman v. Decatur Corp., 135
F.2d 812, 813 (D. C. Cir. 1943); Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.ad 695, 715 (8th Cir. 1942); or of an admin-
istrative agency. B. & 0. R. R. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 388-389 (1936) (concurring opinion by
Brandeis, J.); Carolina Scenic Coach Lines v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 8ox, 804-805 (D. N. C. X944),
aff'd, 323 U. S. 678 (1944); General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935); C4.
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
11' Release No. 3935, Mar. 25, 1947 (see p. 12 of the Release). Compare a reviewing court's remand
to an administrative agency to consider additional evidence. New York v. United States, 331 U. S.
284, 334-335 (1947).
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the SEC."' Were it otherwise, a great deal of money and time would be wasted
by NASD process, and one might wonder what purpose is served by the Maloney
Act.
There is another procedural problem, minor in scope but practically very im-
portant to administration of the NASD's affairs, which sheds light upon the NASD's
special character. That is the problem of publicity. Traditionally exchange proceed-
ings against exchange members are secret; the exchanges generally have been very
insistent that their linen be washed wholly within the family. The same thing is
usually true of all private organizations. But with the nexus between NASD dis-
ciplinary proceedings and government review thereof, there arises the question of
publicity at the stage of an SEC appeal. The problem is sometimes perplexing, for,
under the Act, a disciplined member has a right to an appeal and, since the NASD
order is automatically stayed pending such an appeal, the SEC action is really an
integral part of the NASD process.
In its own affairs, the NASD preserves secrecy, unless the Executive Committee
of the Board of Governors decides otherwise in a given case, until there has been
a final NASD determination. At that point the action is announced, even though
the disciplined member appeals to the SEC. Sometimes there are cases, however,
where it seems desirable to preserve privacy through the SEC stage. On the only
occasions when the question has arisen, the NASD and the members concerned
have agreed on the point, and the SEC has cooperated. The question can become
acute when, after an individual has suffered disqualification, approval is sought of
his employment as a registered representative by a firm with which he was not
connected when his trouble arose. The new firm might hesitate to offer an employ-
ment opportunity if its identity were to be publicly known. In such cases the SEC
has fashioned a procedure to permit prosecution of the matter without public dis-
closure of the name of the new employer." 9 However, in a disciplinary case, where
serious charges are being reviewed by the SEC, privacy may not be consistent with
11" The reader will observe that we have skirted a problem of some difficulty and of considerable
interest. If the NASD determinations are given some presumptive weight-leaving aside the question
whether it might be a presumption exactly like that applied by a court to an administrative agency's
determinations-would it follow that the NASD's process must meet the requirements of constitutional
due process of law? In such circumstances would the constitutional requirements applicable to the
NASD be the same as those applicable to a state agency? If, on the other hand, the NASD judgments
are given no presumptive weight at all, with completely de novo review by the SEC, then why should
the SEC ever be concerned about procedural or other defects in the NASD process? None of these
questions has been considered in the SEC opinions. There is one dictum which assumes that a hearing
by an exchange in a disciplinary case, being "private action," is not a "hearing under the safeguards
provided by due process of law." J. A. Sisto & Co., 7 S. E. C. 647, 653 (940). Cf. pp. 530-531, supra.
This dictum would not necessarily apply to a hearing before the NASD. If the state attaches conse-
quences to the action of a private body which affect property and personal rights--consequences not
voluntarily assumed by the person affected-the mere fact that the action in question is private instead
of state agency action does not mean that constitutional safeguards cannot be applied to the processes
of that private body. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 592, 198 ('944); Edwards v.
Capital Airlines, 176 F.2d 755, 760-762 (D. C. Cir. -1949)- -Quaere vhether .constitutional- due-process
might be imported into the exchange's procedures by virtue of consequences attached by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to expulsion from an exchange.
"
5 Edward E. Trost, Release No. 3955, April 29, 1947. See Loss, SEcuRrrnEs REGULATION 780.
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the public interest. The question received some attention in one case where, on its
own initiative, the SEC reviewed 6 typical cases out of some 70 cases in which the
NASD had disciplined members for failure to abide by price maintenance pro-
visions of an underwriting syndicate. The 6 were picked merely as types, and
it was felt that it would be unfair to these 6 members to disclose their identity. The
SEC agreed to proceed on a "John Doe" basis. But it warned that it could not
assure a similar course in future cases where it might be necessary to summon
as witnesses the persons who had been disciplined.120
Administrative agencies not infrequently make provision for confidential treat-
ment of portions of proceedings before them, and in some of its work the SEC itself
has permitted proceedings to be private until their conclusion. But "John Doe"
proceedings, wherein the identity of the party is never disclosed, present obvious
dangers. Even the preservation of privacy while a proceeding is pending is not
lightly to be permitted. There are possibilities not only of abuse but of fostering
the unhealthy attitude that the matter is of concern only to the SEC and the in-
dividual directly involved. Even while the proceeding is pending within the NASD,
the virtues of washing linen privately, great as they often are, do not always out-
weigh considerations arguing publicity.12'
In the area of the substantive "law" applied by the NASD, the most significant
problems encountered by the SEC have been in cases where the application of
principles of ethics verges upon outright regulation of the economics of the business.
A most obvious ethical problem is presented by excessive charges to customers.
Customers are often either in no position to have information as to fair prices or
are so unsophisticated as to be at the mercy of their broker-dealers. Nonetheless
the Maloney Act provides that the NASD rules shall not "impose any schedule of
prices."'12 The NASD thus far has dealt with the subject of fair prices only in
general terms; its rules simply require its members to conduct themselves honorably
and to make charges bearing a fair relation to the market and to other relevant
circumstances.
Obviously some mark-ups might be so gross as to constitute fraud. Even short
of fraud, some mark-ups might be so high as to be unethical on their face.2 3 The
difficulty comes when a mark-up falls within the zone between the clearly ethical
"50 PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June 1I, 1945 (see p. 2 n. 2 of the Release).
"'In a recent case a member sued to enjoin the NASD from proceeding against it. After the
complaint was filed in court, the NASD proposed to publish a statement in its trade journal concerning
the case. Thereupon the member included, in its injunction proceeding, a request that publication of
such statement be enjoined. The court denied the injunction on the ground that the facts of the case
had already become public through the member's own complaint filed in court and that there was nothing
injurious in the proposed statement. The court did say: ". . . it is well recognized administrative law
that injurious publicity ought not to be resorted to in lieu of authorized and lawful sanctions, and
I have no doubt that, in an appropriate action where it was shown that injurious publicity was being
improperly resorted to, this Court would have ample power to grant injunctive relief." Otis & Co. v.
*NASD, 84 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D. D. C. 1949).
' " Se. s oA(b) (7).12'Shrtman-Gleason, i5--S E. -C. 639, 651-654 (1944).
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and the clearly gross. In this zone it might be useful to have a schedule of per-
missible profit or mark-up. But whether or not the Act would permit such a
schedule, the difficulty of getting NASD members to agree upon a general rule is
apparent.
At one time the Board of Governors, in an effort to be helpful to its members
and the District Committees, did issue an elaborate "interpretation" which, among
other things, invited attention to the fact that in the vast majority of cases members
did not charge mark-ups exceeding 5 per cent' 2 Thereupon, the Board's Chair-
man and the Executive Director of the NASD sent a letter to the various District
Committees stating that when there is a mark-up in excess of 5 per cent "a duty is
imposed upon the member to show to the satisfaction of the Business Conduct
Committee that no violation has occurred."'1 25 Upon a petition to the SEC, in which
it was contended that the Board was attempting to adopt a 5 per cent rule through
the guise of an "interpretation," without going through the prescribed rulemaking
process, the SEC held that the Board had done no more than issue a permissible
interpretation, that a mark-up still had to be shown to be excessive in the light of all
the circumstances in order to constitute a violation of the NASD rules, and that the
letter from the Board Chairman and the Executive Director was incorrect in at-
tempting to instruct that a mark-up exceeding 5 per cent would be prima facie
wrongful.
126
The question came to a further test in Herrick, Waddell & Co. 27  A District
Committee had found the respondent guilty of excessive mark-ups on the basis, it
seems, of a showing that they exceeded 5 per cent-none being higher than 11.4 per
cent-and that other firms in the area had very few mark-ups exceeding 5 per cent.
In the view of the SEC the District Committee had ignored various extenuating cir-
cumstances advanced by the respondent (the Committee had been affirmed by a
divided vote of the Board of Governors). The SEC reversed. In doing so it made
the interesting statement that' 2
... we recognize that the industry may properly protect itself against the so-called "high
cost" or "submarginal" producer, whose excessive cost of doing business results from
inefficiency or unduly high overhead and compels his charging unreasonably high prices
to show a profit.
It was also recognized that a mark-up could be unethical even though not fraudu-
lent.2' But it was denied that mark-ups exceeding "those customarily charged"
are conclusively to be deemed unethical' 3 0 A broader view of all the circumstances
in each case must be taken.''
It is not profitable here to explore all the subtleties of the SEC's opinion. But
it leaves some question as to how far the SEC would permit the NASD to go in leg-
'1' See P. 532, supra. The letter did not imply that a mark-up not exceeding 5 per cent is necessarily
appropriate.
... Re NASD, 17 S. E. . 459, 467 (1944). ... d. at 468 ff.
... Release No. 3935, Mar. 25, 1947. '' Id. at io.
12 d. at 9. ISOld. at 7. ...1d. at 9-11.
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islating more specifically than it has on this subject. Certain passages in the opinion
seem to be dealing with what is "unethical" in the absolute sense, without regard
to the particular language of the NASD rules, and might be interpreted as meaning
that no NASD rule could be sustained which branded a mark-up as wrong unless
it were to be measured in each case in the light of "all the circumstances." Such a
view might protect NASD members from the necessary arbitrariness of a general
rule; but the price of such protection is the arbitrariness inherent in any decision
which is to be made "in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case."
This inherent arbitrariness becomes very important to the individual charged with
a wrong, for the SEC is clear that mere subjective good faith, however strongly
evidenced, cannot excuse a violation of an ethical standard. 3 2  If a standard can
be no more specific than "all the circumstances," there is no way of anticipating
what the standard may be. This is a familiar problem of public law; but when
laymen are attempting to administer their own affairs they may find it difficult to
understand or accept.
Perhaps even more important to the economics of the business than the regula-
tion of mark-ups is the question of assuring compliance with contracts. The
view that a contract gives one a right to performance or to damages is not
shared in the securities business. To a degree true in no other field, those in the
securities business condemn a welsher; performance is expected. No ecclesiastical
tribunal ever imported into contractual obligations such ethical content as is ac-
cepted as of course by most securities dealers."
Breach of the price maintenance provisions of an underwriting syndicate agree-
ment came into question before the NASD on a charge that such a breach is a viola-
tion of an NASD rule which proscribes "conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade.' 4  On its own motion, the SEC reviewed the NASD
Board of Governors' decision that such a charge would be sustained. Strong argu-
ment was made to the SEC that such price maintenance agreements are unlawful
under the antitrust laws, so that a breach of them could not be deemed unethical.
It was also urged that the Maloney Act forbids rules imposing a schedule of prices
and requires that rules be designed "to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market.""' 5
Three of the four Commissioners held that price maintenance in an underwriting
syndicate agreement does not violate the antitrust laws per se; there would be such
a violation only if there were special circumstances such as price maintenance for
an unreasonable length of time. The fourth Commissioner found it unnecessary to
express opinion on the antitrust question.
Three of the four Commissioners held that even though the antitrust laws were
'2 Cf. Stewart, Release-No. 3720, Aug. 7, '945.
13 Commissioner Healy characterized breach of contract, in the PSI Case, Release No. 37oo, June
1I, 1945, as "somewhat 'low down'" (see p. 67 of the Release).I3 Cf. People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exchange, supra note ix.
"'Sec. s5 A(b)( 7 ). The case was PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June 1s, 1945.
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not violated by price maintenance in a syndicate agreement, the NASD rule could
not be interpreted to warrant punishment for a breach of a price maintenance under-
taking because such an undertaking was, literally, a restraint upon a free market.
The Maloney Act calls for rules to promote a free market. Hence a rule enforcing
a restraint-however reasonable the restraint as far as the antitrust laws were
concerned-could not be allowed. Commissioner Healy, dissenting, found no such
bar in the Maloney Act. And the majority agreed with Commissioner Healy that,
apart from the specific prohibition of the Maloney Act, unwarranted breach of a
valid contract amounts to conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade, so violating the NASD rule. As Commissioner Healy expressed it:136
The deliberate, willful and unjustifiable breach of a valid contract between members of
the same association, who have relied on each other in a common undertaking, involving
risks to their capital is, to my mind, neither honorable, just, nor equitable.
Thus the full Commission recognized that, save for a restricted class of cases
involving restraints upon a free market, contracts between members of the NASD,
and presumably contracts between such members and their customers in the course
of the securities business, could be backed up with the sanctions of the NASD. The
efficacy of such sanctions is obviously greater than the mere right of civil suit for
damages or even specific performance. The SEC has thus recognized a most im-
portant police power on the part of the NASD going far beyond normal conceptions
of ethics in business at large and vitally affecting the economics of the trade. Oc-
casion has never arisen for a square SEC ruling; the statements in the case referred to
were obiter. But there is little doubt that the threat of NASD disciplinary action is
a powerful factor in preserving the integrity of contractual relationships in this
business.
This review of the SEC rulings with respect to the NASD can touch only a few
of the features of the day-to-day operation of the NASD as an instrument of social
control. The cases are few where the SEC has been called on to exercise its review
power, and they are still fewer where questions of particular importance have been
presented. It will be years, at the present rate, before a rounded body of SEC law for
NASD guidance is built up. And not yet has a single case of significance found
its way into the courts13
In the meantime the NASD remains a unique institution. If pressure for ex-
15" See page 67 of the Release.
... With the exception of a pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by R. H.
Johnson & Co. from the decision of the SEC reported in Release No. 4694, April 2, x952, the NASD
has been brought into court only once. Otis & Co. sought to enjoin the Board of Governors from proceed-
ing in a disciplinary case on the plea that the question involved in the matter had already been adjudicated
in certain previous proceedings involving that company and the SEC. The injunction was denied.
The ruling in this case, however, is of no general interest except for its recognition that the doctrine
of primary administrative jurisdiction applies to a request that a court interfere with NASD proceedings
before they have been concluded. Otis & Co. v. NASD, 84 F. Supp. 395 (D. D. C. 1949). See note
121 stepra.
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panding social controls over private business continues to mount, a desire to avoid
additional burdens upon the bureaucracy of government may lead to creation
of somewhat similar institutions in other fields. If so, the experience of the NASD,
its methods, and its relationships to the government reviewing agency will provide
a rich source of instruction. Commissioner Healy, who played an active part in
the development of the Maloney Act, and who had a keen appreciation of the pur-
poses of the NASD, once observed of it,"'
It is one of the most interesting and important efforts in the field of government .... and
may lead those interested in cooperation between business and government to consider
its possibilities in other industries.
"'PSI Case, Release No. 3700, June 11, 1945 (see pp. 61-62 n. 8 of the Release).
